Strava Vulnerability Reveals Israeli Securirty Staff Runners

Security fence

Image|Scott Webb, via pixabay

Strava Vulnerability Reveals Israeli Security Staff Run Locations

A vulnerability in STRAVA security has been used by researchers at FakeReporter.net to obtain the details of approximately 100 Israeli Security Staff at the Palmahin Air Force Base & Space Port, Moshav Ora Intelligence base and at 4 other locations in Israel.

Source: twitter.com/FakeReporter

Readers might remember a similar story in 2018 that allowed the discovery of ‘secret’ US military bases in Syria using Strava’s heatmaps. Update: 20 March 2026 and Strava data exposes the position of the French aircraft carrier near Cyprus during wartime.

How Strava Works

Smartphones and sport watches record the GPS route of Strava users’ workouts and the finished workouts are uploaded to the Strava cloud. Strava presents insights back to its users on their app but also shows users their performance compared to others over defined paths they call segments which could be anything longer than a few tens of metres. Each segment has a leaderboard with the leaders shown by name, age and sex. It is sometimes possible to click on the leaderboard to find out more about the leaders and their sporting activities.

How Did It Happen This Time?

The breach looks to be a combination of deliberately fake workouts and security settings that confused Israeli military personnel.

Firstly it seems that researcher Ez Shehl created some fake yet realistic workouts at various military bases without ever going there and then uploaded them to Strava. Reality Check: This IS plausible. I think if I had a couple of hours I could probably do that if I knew the location of the base. I would create a GPX route using one of many tools (eg Strava!) and then reverse-engineer real run data from another workout onto those GPS points.

Secondly, any Strava segment that was used in the ‘run’ will have a leaderboard. It seems that this is where Strava have a problem as some Strava users appear on those leaderboards even if their accounts are set to private.

Reality Check: I don’t think this part of the story is correct. It’s more likely that security personnel did not properly secure their accounts…admittedly Strava could have made it more obvious how to do this. There appears to be no single ‘kill switch’ that fully privatises the account.

Strava privacy settings showing multiple options

Then again Strava claims to have already fixed whatever issue there was.

What Information Was Compromised

The researchers responsibly went through the proper channels and none of the details that were discovered about military personnel have been made public. It seems that it was possible to ascertain the name, user photos and locations of some of the run locations of military personnel.

When asked for comment, Strava said “We take matters of privacy very seriously and have addressed the reported issues.” (via the Haaretz newspaper)

Take Out

The heatmap breach from 5 years ago always seemed like a bit of a storm in a teacup to me. Nothing too personal was really revealed other than the location of large military bases that could be seen on Google Maps in any case plus sections in the bases where soldiers frequently ran.

This time it’s more important as individual names and photos were obtained.

Back to the Strava Hub

Last Updated on 28 May 2026 by the5krunner


My favourite kit and nutrition

  • Maurten — the race nutrition trusted by elite athletes. Gels and drink mix engineered to be easy on the stomach.
  • Garmin 90-degree charging adapter — the small adapter that keeps your charging cable tidy at the stem. Essential for race day.
  • Garmin charging puck — the fastest and most reliable way to top up your Garmin before a session.
  • Ravemen FR300 — front light that mounts directly under your Garmin or Wahoo head unit. Keeps your bars clean and your beam pointed where it matters.
  • Garmin Varia RTL515 — radar rear light that alerts you to vehicles approaching from behind. Pairs with your Edge or Garmin watch.
  • Stryd — the footpod that brings running power to your Garmin. The single most useful running upgrade I have made.
  • Favero Assioma Pro RS2 — the power meter pedals most serious cyclists end up choosing. Accurate, easy to move between bikes.


Reader-Powered Content

Buy me a coffee

This content is not sponsored. It’s mostly me behind the labour of love, which is this site, and I appreciate everyone who supports it.

Support the site: Follow (free, fewer ads) · Subscribe (paid, ad-free) · Buy Me A Coffee ❤️

All articles are written by real people, fact-checked, and verified for originality. See the Editorial Policy. FTC: Affiliate Disclosure — some links pay commission. As an Amazon Associate, I earn from qualifying purchases.

5 thoughts on “Strava Vulnerability Reveals Israeli Securirty Staff Runners

  1. At the end of the day, it’s not a security breach when anyone (including military/intel/etc) publish their own whereabouts on a social media network, and then don’t properly set their security settings.

    The only way you show up on the leaderboard is if a given activity is set to public. That’s it. It looks like these people set this to public (and Strava’s response wording pretty much confirms that).

    The ‘Hide your map completely’ is specifically for a scenario where you set your activity to public, but then want to hide the map (roughly this use-case, but more a case of pretending to be indoors rather than out riding during the work day).

    Said again, this isn’t a vulnerability in Strava. This is simply someone not setting an activity to private, and failing OpSec.

    1. always helpful to read the full reporting before – particular the part of private activity showing up on a fabricated segment lists – otherwise you end up in typical DCR nonsense fashion “I send it back and buy my own Garmin gear BS….”

  2. it’s simple, if your Strava profile is showing up on leaderboards even if your account is set to privat that is a security breach and opposite of what Strava is claiming on privacy. period .

Comments are closed.